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The opening up 
of Latin America 
to the exterior 
Aníbal Pinto* 
In an article which appeared in issue No. 9 (Decem-
ber 1979) of the CEPAL Review, the author analysed 
the internationalization of the world economy and its 
significance and consequences for the periphery. As 
a follow-up to that article, and within the same gene-
ral framework, he now raises the controversial ques-
tion of Latin America's opening up to the exterior. 
After a brief recapitulation of salient past devel-
opments , he considers future prospects and their 
implications for the structure and tendencies of ex-
ternal relations. He then examines the reasons for, 
varieties of and dangers in the policy of openness, as 
well as the significance, options and problems of a 
strategy founded on the development of industrial-
ization and the achievement ol a new form of integra-
tion into the world economy. 
His basic argument is that the intensification of 
exports, particularly of manufactures, is a necessary 
and possible condition for stimulating industrializa-
tion in Latin America and improving its position in 
the world economy. For that reason he cautions 
against those policies of openness which aim at a 
radical reorientation towards an 'in ward-directed' 
pattern of development, maintaining that export pro-
motion should be complemented by expansion of 
the domestic market and regional integration, and 
should b e conceived within the framework of the 
process of industrialization and development. 
Consequently, present circumstances, as well as 
those which are likely to exist in the future, enable 
the author to assume the viability of an economic 
growth strategy including among its requirements 
the sustained expansion of exports, although at the 
same time, he does not deny the importance of other 
factors which complicate the situation, such as emer-
gent protectionism in the centres and the political 
capacity to strengthen regional links, negotiate with 
the transnational corporations and guarantee the Sta-
te a guiding role. 
*Fonner Director of the CEPAL Economic Develop-
ment Division. 
I 
Background and prospects 
1. Outline of developments since the 1950s 
In the first place, the pattern of trade relations 
from 1950 until recently shows both the consid-
erable growth of export and import flows (par-
ticularly after the mid-1960s) and, on the other 
hand, the fact that this growth only represented 
a partial return to the degrees of openness to 
the exterior which prevailed at the beginning 
of the period 1950-1977. This is also more or 
less true of the trends in the terms of trade.1 
Secondly, it is clear that financial flows 
followed a very different course, increasing 
substantially —even during the difficult inter-
national period following 1973— and changing 
in some fundamental regards (for example, the 
increase in the private component of the flows). 
T h e main consequence in recent years has 
been the dependence of a considerable propor-
tion of imports upon external financing and the 
absorption of a large proportion of export earn-
ings by debt servicing. In addition, there were 
more moderate changes in the relationship bet-
ween the regional product and debt, although 
here again there was a clear deterioration over 
the period. 
As a result, a very troublesome vicious cir-
cle has arisen in which the growth of imports 
has called for a rising amount of external financ-
ing, the servicing of which in turn absorbs in-
creasingly large proportions of the value of ex-
ports, despite the growth of the latter. 
These circumstances raise clear but dif-
ficult choices, especially if the underlying situ-
ation remains the same or grows worse. On the 
one hand, to hold down the growth of imports 
in order to reduce the burden —and vulnerabil-
ity— involved in the absorption of export earn-
ings by rising service payments can unques-
tionably affect the rate of" economic develop-
ment , with easily foreseeable consequences, 
whatever opinion one may hold of that indi-
cator's significance. On the other hand, if this 
Quan t i t a t ive information may be found in CEPAL, 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1978, vol. II (E/ 
CEPAL/G. 1103/Add. 1), Part Three. 
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approach is rejected and it is desired to main-
tain the growth of imports —albeit at more 
moderate rates— it will be necessary to secure 
ei ther more external financing or a more vigor-
ous growth of exports —or both at once, in vary-
ing combinations. The discussion which fol-
lows must be placed against this background. 
2. The prospects for external relations 
In embarking on this part of the article, it may 
be useful to start from the central idea that the 
process of internationalization of the world 
economy (and society) will continue, as will 
that of the steadily growing linkage of Latin 
America with the exterior and within itself. 
Naturally, the possibility that the process will 
lose ground or fail to make headway —as has 
occurred in other periods and is suggested at 
present— cannot be ruled out, but the long-
term outlook does seem to lie along those lines. 
(a) Separation from and linkage with the in-
ternational economy 
It must be admitted that the above premise 
runs counter to a position which became quite 
widespread in the 1960s and is still held in 
some circles in the periphery, although it is 
now less prominent in Latin America. We refer 
to the school of thought which advocates 'de-
linking' from the centres and from the global 
system in which they predominate. 
In some of the best studies of this question 
this dissentient approach is summarized as 
follows: 
"...the argument is not just that the internation-
al links are the conduits through which the 
dependant country is drained of its surplus for 
the benefit of the dominant countries. The in-
ternational links also penetrate and deform the 
internal socio-political structures of the pe-
ripheral country, leading to the waste and mis-
allocation of whatever is left behind by the 
foreigners. A decreasing number of delinkers 
argue that under these circumstances the de-
penden t country is unlikely to industrialize 
and certainly will no be able to develop its 
heavy and capital goods industries. Most de-
linkers will now admit that dependent indus-
trialization and growth are possible, but they 
argue that such processes will feature not only 
the polarization and unevenness of classical 
capitalist expansion but an exaggerated and 
even more monstrous version of it"2. 
Without stopping to make a detailed anal-
ysis of this approach, it is worth pointing out 
that in the work of some of its more representa-
tive advocates3 this attitude forms part of a his-
torical approach to the problem inspired to 
some extend by that well-known aphorism "re-
culer pour mieux sauter". 
Thus, one of them writes: 
"Saying that development of the periphery 
requires the setting up of autocentric national 
structures which break with the world market 
means expressing an undeniable contradiction. 
Capitalism has unified the world, in its own 
way, by imposing upon it the hierarchy of 
centre and periphery. Socialism, which cannot 
exist unless it is superior to capitalism in every 
way, cannot be a juxtaposition of national so-
cialisms. It must organize the world into a uni-
fied whole without inequality, and cannot be 
completed until it has attained this objective. 
However, the road that leads to this end passes 
by way of the self-assertion of those nations that 
are victims of the present set-up, and which 
cannot assemble the conditions for their pros-
perity and full participation in the modern 
world unless they first of all assert themselves 
as complete nations."4 
What is more, this position has been under-
mined by the recent tendency to become in-
tegrated in the world market displayed by the 
socialist countries —including China, whose 
past experience was often given as an illustra-
tion— or suffers from the rather unattractive 
nature of its concrete examples (such as Burma, 
Cambodia or Albania).15 
2Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Delinking North and 
South: unshackled ov unhinged?", in Albert Fishlow and 
others, Rich and Poor Nation.s in the World Economy, (New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1978), p . 103. 
3 See, for example, S. Ainin, Accumulation on a World 
Scale: a Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, vol. 
1 (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974), and A. Em-
manuel , Unequal Exchange: a Study of the Imperialism of 
Trade (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972). 
4 Amin, op. cit., p. 33. 
5 T h e ease of Japan has also been adduced in these 
arguments, but this is to overlook, among other things, the 
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In brief, the discussion has centred on the 
paths which internationalization can or should 
follow, particularly from the standpoint of the 
per iphery and, within it, the Latin American 
universe which has long formed part of it, with 
the characteristics and consequences de-
scribed above. In sum, emphasis has now 
shifted to the selectivity of the process, i. e., the 
forms of integration (or relative delinking) 
within the prevailing current.6 
(b) A basic imperative: the imported 
component 
Going straight to the heart of the matter, it 
might be said that the most concrete reason 
why Latin America should continue fostering 
and developing its links with the world econ-
omy is its growing need and demand for a vari-
ety of imported goods both now and in the 
future. This is the prime and most obvious rea-
son for internationalization. Of course, it has its 
evident counterpart in the need of a suitable 
quantity of foreign exchange which must be 
provided by exports and/or external financing. 
A recent CEPAL study on this question 
provides a tentative estimate of the region's 
future needs of imports of goods and services, 
assuming a growth rate of 6.4% a year (slightly 
below the rate for the period 1965-1974) and 
income elasticity of demand for imports some-
what lower than in that period.7 Needless to 
say, these are not forecasts and it would be 
perfectly legitimate to start from other esti-
mates. However, the figures in table 1 are suffi-
imperialist dimension of its economic transformation prior 
to the Second World War, although its relative delinking 
from the western centres in a number ot aspects which can-
not b e enumerated here is undeniable. 
6 In the study mentioned earlier, C. Diaz-Alejandro 
recalls a well-known article by J. M. Keynes ["National 
self-sufficiency", The Yale Review, (June 1933)], in which, 
together with expressing his sympathy with those who 
would minimize, rather than those who would maximize, 
economic entanglement between nations, particularly in 
the financial field, he wains that "it should not be a matter 
of tearing up roots but oi'slowly training a plant to grow in a 
different direction" (Diaz-Alejandro, op. cit., pp. 95 and 
117). 
7 C E P A L , "Long-term trends and prospects of the de-
velopment of Latin America" (E/CE PAL/1076), Santiago, 
1979. 
ciently striking to stand the test of reasonable 
objections. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 
AND SERVICES 
(Millions of dollars) 
















Source: CEPAL, Long-term trends and prospects of the 
development of Latin America (E/CE PAL/1076). 
As may be seen, even at constant prices the 
value of purchases abroad will very nearly dou-
ble in each decade considered. 
The buoyancy of this demand is shown by 
its growth rates (see table 2). While the rates 
calculated for the years 1980-2000 are below 
those for 1965-1974, which were exceptional in 
many respects, they are almost double those 
recorded in 1950-1960. As may be seen, it is 
estimated that such growth of imports will be 
particularly strong in the larger countries. 
This picture should immediately be con-
trasted with the prospects on the export side, 
since exports are at once the primary means 
making possible these flows of imports, a tel-
ling component of global demand and the other 
basic channel of internationalization. 
Looking once more at table 2, it is easy to 
see that here too the region is expected to de-
velop dynamically, at rates above those of both 
1950-1960 and 1965-1974, this latter period be-
ing that in which the two flows were most 
asymmetrical. In any event, there is one strik-
ing difference among the groups considered: 
the case of the group of medium-sized coun-
tries, whose exports increased very little in vol-
ume during the second period, although they 
had grown considerably in 1950-1960." 
8 T h i s is primarily due to the influence of the volume of 
oil exports by Venezuela, which were deliberately held 
down to conserve reserves. 
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T a b l e 2 



























































Source: CEPAL, Long-term trends and prospects ..., op. cit. 
iL Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
'Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. 
'Bol iv ia , Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(c) Structural implications 
If we accept that the flows of imports and 
exports will increase considerably, it is neces-
sary to ask how this may affect the structure of 
the external links of the region's economies, 
particularly from the standpoint of the future 
proportions which foreign supply and demand 
will represent in the overall system. In other 
words —to use the terms in which the question 
is usually phrased— does this mean that the 
region is shifting from a stage of inward-di-
rected growth to a stage of outward-directed 
growth or unequivocal 'opening up ' to the ex-
terior? 
From an overall viewpoint, the answer ap-
pears to be in the negative. It may be seen from 
the data presented in table 3 that the estimated 
import and export coefficients in 1980-2000 
suggest a situation resembling that in 1970, 
more open from the standpoint of imports, and 
more closed from that of exports, and in both 
cases with lower levels than in the 1950s and 
1960s.9 
9 With respect to the differences between the two coef-
ficients —particularly marked in the case of the medium-
sized countries— it should be remembered that these are 
primarily affected by the behaviour of the terms of trade, 
net external financing and payments of profits and interest 
on foreign capital. The study in question does not antici-
pate major changes in these factors from the region at stand-
point, bu t it is assumed that the terms of trade of the me-
However, the data also show clear differ-
ences between the groups of countries. The 
levels of external linkage are lower in the larger 
economies (although these do show differ-
ences between each other which cannot be ex-
amined here), rise significantly in the medium-
sized countries, and are highest in the small 
countries, where they are well above the levels 
recorded in 1950 and 1960. 
There are many causes underlying these 
differences: it is almost tautological, for exam-
ple, to mention the present and potential size of 
domestic markets. In this connexion, and be-
cause of its significance for a later discussion, it 
is worth recalling the distinction perceptively 
drawn by A. Lewis regarding the role of foreign 
trade in development, either as the 'lubricant' 
of the process or as its engine.10 
In the case of the larger economies, the 
growth of exports is an essential condition for 
securing the increased volume of imports called 
for by the expansion of the global product, even 
though this is mainly destined for the domestic 
market —although, of course, this is not to un-
derestimate the dynamic effect of external de-
dium-sized economies will improve appreciably (basically 
due to trends in Venezuela following the rise in oil prices), 
as will the external financing coefficient in the small econo-
mies (see E/CEPAL/1076). 
10 A. Lewis, "The evolution of the international econ-
omic order", Princeton University, mimeo, 1971. 
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Table 3 







































































Source; CEPAL, Long-term trends and prospects ..., op. cit. 
maud. Consequently, for these economies ex-
ports primarily act as a 'lubricant'. 
In the economies with more or less limited 
domestic markets the situation is obviously 
quite different, since exports represent a con-
siderable proportion of total demand and ulti-
mately have a bigger effect on the growth of the 
economy. Thus they are closer to the 'engine of 
growth' image, although the role of the do-
mestic market remains dominant. 
Naturally, this distinction cannot be car-
ried to extremes, but it is acceptable in general 
terms and allows a variety of combinations in 
the case of concrete activities or countries. 
This passing digression should not ob-
scure out the basic conclusion regarding the 
question raised earlier, namely, that (bearing 
in mind the differences between the various 
groups) the outlook for vigorous growth of in-
ternational links does not entail a substantial 
change in the structure or historical pattern of 
the process. In other words, inward-directed 
development will continue to predominate, 
both for the region as a whole and for most of its 
countries. 
II 
The opening-up process 
1. The reasons for opening up to the exterior 
The above data and the corresponding deduc-
tions appear to contradict some lines of thought 
and praxis which have recently gained great 
significance in Latín America and elsewhere. 
We shall begin by examining their general di-
rection and the reasoning on which they are 
based, and then go on to consider some variants 
of them. 
Broadly speaking, they can be summarized 
as sharing the premise that it is necessary to 
foster external relations, take greater advantage 
of the opportunities arising from the interna-
tional division oflabour, and consequently at-
tach priority to exports, imports and external 
financing." All of this is covered by that famil-
iar blanket temí 'opening up to the exterior'. 
What are the underlying reasons for this 
general approach? 
1 It should be noted that these concerns also arise in 
countries with very different styles of development and 
institutional systems, such as Cuba. Concerning the new 
guidelines of that country's economic policy in the 1970s, 
the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1978 states that 
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It is worth mentioning some of them in 
passing, although they are doubtless well 
known, since they have a place in this dis-
cussion. 
(a) The international setting and the stubborn 
external bottleneck 
Two elements appear particularly salient. 
One of these relates to the international setting, 
and the other to some issues which have 
troubled Latin American economic policy. 
The first stems from the well-documented 
expansion of world trade following the war, and 
particularly during the period 1965-1973, the 
magni tude and significance of which can only 
be appreciated fully in the light of the condi-
tions that framed the region's development in 
the prolonged period ranging from the Great 
Depression to the end of the 1940s. 
T h e most important factor in this overall 
picture was the openness of the United States 
economy, which in the course of the post-war 
period managed to double its import-product 
coefficient (from less than 5% to over 10%) and 
transform the dollar shortage of the beginning 
of the period into a glut which has ended up as 
one of the biggest problems of the central econ-
omies and a major cause of the international 
monetary disequilibrium.12 
Within this transformation of the external 
setting the importance must be stressed of the 
impact caused by the experience of a group of 
—quite dissimilar— Asian countries13 which 
took advantage of the opportunities thus 
created with great flexibility and energy and 
developed a form of open or export-oriented 
industrialization which some have seen as an 
alternative to the model prevailing in Latin 
America and elsewhere. 
" the new approach to production strategy meant that the 
economy had to have foreign exchange both for capital 
investment purposes and to supplement the domestic pro-
duct ion of consumer goods; and this called for a high, 
steady growth of'exports" (E/CEPAL/G. 1103, p . 296). 
1 2It is worth noting in passing that this is one of the few 
bases of CEPAL thinking circa 1949 to be set right by sub-
sequent events , although this does not detract from the 
great significance of the shift of the "principal cyclical 
cen t re" fonn Great Britain to the United States. 
11 Primarily South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore. 
We cannot stop here to examine this ex-
perience and the comparative judgements it 
involves. Suffice it to stress the essential point: 
that the differences in the historical and struc-
tural patterns are so deep that superficial anal-
ogies merely call to' mind the aphorism that 
such exercises are the main enemy of the social 
sciences. Besides, it is enough to review any 
conscientious analysis of such cases, even by 
their advocates, to recognize their peculiar na-
ture (or natures).14 Nevertheless, their influ-
ence should not be underestimated. 
Finally, the external setting was radically 
altered by the unprecedented fluidity and 
magnitude of credit flows, particularly from 
private international banks. 
(b) Endogenous factors 
These changes in the international setting 
have had their counterpart in the development 
of relations with the exterior as outlined above. 
This development has involved a characteristic 
facet of Latin American experience since the 
crisis: the chronic bottleneck and disrupting 
fluctuations of trade, stemming from the imba-
lance in the relative dynamism of imports and 
exports, and also from the overwhelming im-
portance of a few basic export commodities. 
Thus if the international factors implied 
increased opportunities and, specifically, de-
mand for exportable products, these endoge-
nous factors brought one of the most acute 
problems of regional growth, which had to be 
alleviated or resolved. 
In addition to these elements, others 
should be mentioned which also spring from 
the domestic setting and the polyvalent and 
—from some angles— contradictory repercus-
sions of the industrialization process. Sum-
marizing a familiar CEPAL line of analysis, this 
development was subjected simultaneously to 
two forms of pressures. The first arose from the 
higher demand for imports stemming from 
growth in incomes and a number of inherent 
1 4See, for example, "El desarrollo industrial orientado 
para la exportación: la experiencia de Corea", by Larry 
Westphal; summary by the author, with comments by Fre-
derick E. Berger, in "Políticas de promoción de exporta-
ciones", vol. I (E/CEPAL/1046), pp. 73-86. 
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characteristics of the process, such as the lack of 
vertical complementarity of the emerging in-
dustrial activities and the spur of service pay-
ments on foreign capital and loans. 
The second source of pressure stemmed 
from the constraints of the domestic markets 
which, along with other factors such as the 
distribution of income, and according to the 
particular situation of each country, hindered 
the progress of certain stages of industrial-
ization.15 While the small countries with diffi-
culty approached the limits of 'easy substitu-
tion', based on branches of light or traditional 
industry and basic inputs, these constraints be-
came conspicuous for the large countries em-
barking upon 'difficult substitution' linked 
with the growing presence of the transnational 
corporations. 
(c) The domestic potential 
All these aspects led, as mentioned earlier, 
to the need for and desirability of altering the 
pattern of relations with the exterior. But other 
factors which also affect the process from 
another angle should not be overlooked, such 
as the domestic capacity to undertake this task 
thanks to the new structures and potential 
created by the advance of industrialization in 
the broad rather than the sectoral sense. 
As is shown by the experience of the coun-
tries which have advanced furthest in this di-
rection, the process involved establishing a 
fulcrum or springboard whereby manufactur-
ing exports could reach external markets; and 
this is obviously important for the prospects 
and options open in the future, a question dis-
cussed below. 
As indicated earlier, we are not referring 
merely to the specific contribution of manufac-
turing activities in this field. Equally important 
has been the multifarious irradiation of indus-
trial praxis in labour and entrepreneurial train-
ing, in the quantitative and qualitative growth 
of the public and private technocracy, in the 
modernization and readjustment of the institu-
tional and instrumental apparatus of economic 
policy, and in many other respects. Indeed, this 
10 See Economic Survey of Latin America, 1975 (Un-
ited Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.11,G.l), Part Two. 
is another application of the principle of'learn-
ing by doing'. 
It is true, as sometimes pointed out, that 
many lines of export diversification were se tup 
prior to post-war industrial development or 
have nothing to do with it. However, it is dif-
ficult to believe that these would have broken 
into world markets without all the transforma-
tions which we have outlined."* 
In brief, if the first set of factors induced or 
encouraged a reappraisal of the approach to 
external links, this last factor was for some the 
objective condition governing the viability of 
doing so. 
2. The variants of opening up to the exterior 
The form in which these motivating forces have 
been translated into lines of economic policy 
varies considerably from country to country, 
partly in the light of their particular situations 
and partly —and sometimes decisively— as a 
result of the way in which they interpret the 
problem. There is certainly an enormous range 
of ideas about the forms and functions of the 
global process of internationalization. 
At a high level of abstraction two lines of 
thought and action can be distinguished, char-
acterized primarily by the more or less com-
prehensive and radical nature of the alternative 
diagnosis of the situation prevailing until 
roughly the mid-1960s. These two broad cur-
rents may in turn be broken down into different 
conceptions of a number of more specific and 
relevant questions for the purpose of this anal-
ysis, such as the nature and role of industrial-
ization, the degree and form of openness to the 
exterior, protectionism and import policy, 
From the first and more general angle, it is 
no distortion or caricature of the facts to distin-
guish two basic approaches to the question. One 
might be termed the ideological approach, with 
no pejorative undertones; the other is rather 
pragmatic. From an overall point of view, look-
ing at the Latin American picture in recent 
years it might be said that the experience of the 
It is worth bearing in mind the impact on the growth 
ot non-traditional exports ot investment in inf'raestructure 
-basic services, roads, refrigeration and packing plants 
(with large-scale State participation). 
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southern countries (Chile, Argentina and Uru-
guay) falls within the first category while Co-
lombia, Brazil and the other countries of the 
region are closer to the second. 
With regard to the ideological approach, it 
seems clear that the transformation of external 
relations is part of a much broader—what used 
to be called 'totalizing'— context and is in fact 
only a fragment of a readjustment which covers 
practically all dimensions of social reality, al-
though its impact is not the same in all of them. 
This outstanding feature also signifies a 
substantial degree of discontinuity with re-
spect to the past, both in general and in particu-
lar aspects, which is part and parcel of an al-
ternative 'ideal type'. If this is not found in the 
present scenarios,17 by explicit or implicit as-
sociation one can go back to earlier ones, and 
particularly those of the nineteenth century, 
thus reviving former approaches. 
The other main variant differs in both 
these respects, i.e., both in its degree and in its 
components. It does not have the same multi-
dimensional nature and does not involve an 
essential break with the preceding trends and 
structures which it wishes to modify. In other 
words, it is based on the varying interplay of 
change and continuity. 
To illustrate these contrasts, and given the 
impossibility of undertaking a systematic com-
parison here, let us turn to firmer ground and 
examine some specific aspects. 
(a) Approaches to industrialization 
There is little doubt that the views held on 
the past and future significance of industrial-
ization, and of so-called substitution industrial-
ization in particular,18 are one of the main 
points of difference both between the two 
above-mentioned approaches and between 
them and others which may be distinguished. 
17 The 'social market economy'of the Federal Republic 
of Germany is usually given as the archetypal reference, 
although many characteristics of that country's experience 
do not correspond to the postulated 'ideal type'. 
l f iWith regard to the concept and raison d'être of sub-
stitution industrialization, see En Torno a las Ideas de la 
CEPAL; Desarrollo, industrialización y comercio exterior, 
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, No. 13 (Santiago, CEPAL, 1977). 
Without going further into the critique of 
the process, it is clear that the first position 
views openness to the exterior in general, and 
the promotion of exports and liberalization of 
imports in particular, as a drastic about-turn 
with respect to the earlier approach based on 
the domestic market and import substitution 
and selectivity. The objective is in fact to move 
from inward-directed to outward-directed de-
velopment.19 In addition, within its overall 
view of the matter it subjects the general pro-
cess of industrialization (and that of develop-
ment) to the logic of comparative advantage, 
the decisions of the market mechanism and 
open competition with the exterior. 
The 'pragmatic' approach, as may readily 
be supposed, adopts a different view which 
basically goes beyond the apparent contradic-
tion between the opposed terms and attempts 
to bring them together in new combinations. 
To illustrate this approach it is worth saving 
time by recalling some observations by C. 
Diaz-Alejandro in his famous study of the Co-
lombian case.20 He states that the picture which 
emerges from the policies followed since 1967 
is somewhat different from the textbook de-
scriptions of the shift from import substitution 
19 In a recent study, for example, it was argued that "in 
the middle of the previous decade ... some Latin American 
countries began to implement the outward-directed devel-
opment strategy by means of policies to stimulate non-tra-
ditional exports" (Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and José Pinera 
Echeñique , "Políticas de promoción de las exportaciones 
en los países en desarrollo", in Políticas de promoción de 
exportaciones, vol. I l l (E/CEPAL/1046/Add.2), p . 55). 
Professor Rosenstein-Rodan, criticizing the negative 
t rends in the development of some countries, attributes 
them to "the continuation of a mistaken policy of 'import 
substitution' instead of outward-directed development 
(successful example: Brazil)" ("Characteristics of Latin 
American development", paper presented at the Second 
Panama Banking Convention, in April 1979 (mimeo)). 
2 0 T h e quotations are taken from a presentation on the 
author's work Colombia, Special Conference Series on 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, vol. 
IX (New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1976) made at the Fundación para la Educación y el Desa-
rrollo in Bogotá in 1973, and reproduced for an ILPES 
course in 1979. Attention focuses on the Colombian case 
because it is usually considered to have been more open 
than Brazil, besides having been a pioneer in this direction. 
The Brazilian case, on the other hand, self-styledly prag-
matic, differs more profoundly from the ideological ap-
proach in a number of key aspects —the role of the State and 
of public enterprises, and the clear continuation of the 
process of substitution industrialization. 
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to export-promotion policies, and adds that the 
change from an import substitution policy to an 
export promotion policy in Colombia should 
not b e regarded as a volte-face. More precisely, 
he stresses that the launching of the 1967 poli-
cies directed relative incentives towards ex-
ports in contrast with import substitution. 
However, and perhaps more importantly, these 
policies strengthened the incentives for se-
lected import substitution and export activities 
in relation to the non-tradeables sector. 
A similar interpretation and approach to 
the problem may be seen in other cases, includ-
ing that of Korea.21 
(b) Other related aspects 
The contrast between the two approaches, 
as pointed out above, is also visible in a number 
of subsidiary aspects of the overall approach to 
industrialization: comparative advantages, pro-
tectionism and liberalization of imports. 
I t would be ridiculous to attempt to make a 
suitable review here of the first of these as-
pects, which is the subject of long-standing and 
unresolved controversy that becomes more 
nebulous with the inclusion in the analysis of 
legitimate and significant non-economic vari-
ables (national imperatives, social, humanita-
rian and cultural values, etc.). It is nevertheless 
worth mentioning from the standpoint of this 
discussion. 
Starting from the other end of the range of 
positions, it is obvious that the pragmatic ap-
proach —by its very nature— has not managed 
to produce a clear and comprehensive theoreti-
2 1 In this connexion, L. Westphal states that under the 
impetus of import substitution for non-durable consumer 
goods, the growth of the industrial product was quite rapid 
(12% annually) during the second half of the 1950s. How-
ever, at the beginning of the following decade opportuni-
ties for 'easy' import substitution began to dwindle rapidly, 
and ultimately industrial growth to slacken. He adds that 
selective import substitution has permitted the concentra-
tion of scarce investment resources in one or a few sectors at 
a time and thereby made possible greater exploitation of 
economies of scale and of the linkages among closely inter-
related activities (Westphal, op. cit, vol. VIII, pp. 73 and 
76). A study in the same document on the case of Yugoslavia 
points out that import substitution and export promotion do 
not appear to have been seen as alternatives, but were 
followed in different sectors at different times. (V. Dubey, 
"Yugoslavia: exportaciones de bienes y políticas de explo-
tación', V. Dubey: Resumen del trabajo, ibid., vol. X, p. 95.) 
cal corpus on this issue which is unquestion-
ably extremely complex in that it necessarily 
goes beyond and economistic framework. 
However, it is important not to underesti-
mate the valuable contribution to the analysis 
of this issue contained in studies and proposals 
in the field of planning, since these are the 
concrete manifestation of resource allocation 
criteria both within the domestic economy and 
with regard to the external sector. 
Indeed, these contributions have made it 
possible to blend the different senses of the 
concept of comparative advantage —which can 
be absolute (where the natural resource en-
dowment is predominant), relative (when it 
emerges from the contrasting of viable options) 
or acquired (in which national determination is 
crucial, and which involves 'learning by 
doing').22 
The ideological approach may not ignore 
the complexity of the problem, but its inhibi-
tions are swept away by the value placed on a 
guiding criterion which is very clear and cate-
gorical, "that of comparison with international 
standards, which are basically determined by 
the levels of productivity and prices prevailing 
in the central economies. Greater or lesser 
competitivity as compared with this point of 
reference will determine the 'economic viabil-
ity' or 'efficiency' of the activities in question. 
'Comparability' with these levels will justify 
their existence; 'comparative disadvantages' 
their elimination".23 
This is, of course, the extreme version of a 
Darwinian logic which has never actually exis-
ted, but it would be wrong to underestimate its 
past and present influence in sympathetic cir-
cles both in and outside the region. 
2 2 The experience of the industrial late-comers, whether 
developed or peripheral countries, provides a clear picture 
of the different combinations and focal points in each par-
ticular case. Broadly speaking, it seems evident that rela-
tive and acquired advantages have tended to weigh more 
than absolute advantages in the modern setting, although 
this can in no way be interpreted as an expression of ar-
bitrary 'voluntarism'. It goes without saying that market 
size and the volume and nature of natural resources are 
important elements of comparative advantage, and in par-
ticular of degress of openness. 
23A. Pinto, "False dilemmas and real options in current 
Latin American debate", CEPAL Review, No. 6 (second 
haI fof l978) ,p .38 . 
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(c) Protectionism and liberalization 
The different approaches to protection and 
liberalization of imports, which should be re-
viewed within the context of the general at-
ti tudes to industrialization, are sufficiently 
well defined to require merely a cursory 
examination. 
In the southern countries, and particularly 
Chile, the change of direction on both these 
fronts has been radical. In the others, on the 
other hand, it is moderate and sometimes inter-
rupted. In the case of Colombia, for example, 
the free-trade experiment of 1965-1966, follow-
ing the traditional recommendations of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, was, in the words 
of one expert, a 'traumatic experience' which 
paradoxically paved the way for export promo-
tion within a context of much greater control 
over imports.21 Brazil's protectionist armour re-
mained virtually intact, although it was sub-
stantially revamped in the mid-1960s in order 
to adjust it to the new stages of industrializa-
tion. On the import side there was also some 
liberalization,25 although heavy duties were 
levied on luxury goods - unlike what happened 
in some countries further south. 
It should be recalled here that on both 
these issues there had for k W been some degree 
of consensus about the need to rationalize the 
system of protection inherited from the times of 
severe disequilibrium in the external accounts, 
to which attention was drawn repeatedly in 
C E P A L studies.-'' Policy on non-essential or 
luxury imports was likewise the subject of re-
current discussion. One representative attitude 
-"* Diaz-Alejandro, Colombia, op. cit. Elsewhere the 
author states that "the Colombian experience indicates that 
drastic import liberalization is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for export growth" (p. 208). Going 
further into the matter, he adds that while there does seem 
to be a decline in extravagant and large-scale new initia-
tives in the field of import substitution, it remains true that 
the import control machinery is still used vigorously to 
protect existing activities (and some new ones). 
2r> A direct reflection of this is the growth of imports of 
non-durable consumer goods, although their share of the 
total (around 5%) did not increase significantly. See 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1975, op. cit. 
2,1 See, for example, En torno a las ¡deas de la CEPAL; 
Problemas de la Industrialización en América Latina, 
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N.« 14 (Santiago, Chile, CEPAL, 
1977). 
stressed that drastic restrictions on such im-
ports meant that resources would be siphoned 
off to produce them domestically, and therefore 
advocated some margin of freedom which in 
turn would provide an attractive field of 
taxation. 
Be that as it may, the crux of the disagree-
ment appears to lie in the differences of 
approach to the interrelated functions of pro-
tectionism, export promotion and the flow and 
nature of imports within the development pro-
cess. The ideological approach places all these 
elements in the framework of the greatest pos-
sible openness, which should thus come close 
to the ideal of perfect competition both 
domestically and in foreign trade. The different 
varieties of the pragmatic approach agree that 
rational and effective protection is needed and 
that export promotion should be the basic in-
strument for increasing the purchase of those 
imports which contribute most to development 
and well-being, all of which cannot be 
achieved without the application of selective 
criteria concerning their nature. 
3. The dangers of opening up to the exterior 
Going beyond the reasons underlying the 
search for a new pattern of external links and 
the major forms which can be distinguished in 
this connexion, it is worth pausing to consider a 
number of dangers latent already encountered 
in this experience. This must be done before 
proceeding to examine the options visible for 
the future. 
A recent study makes a valuable contribu-
tion to the analysis of this problem and can 
guide our approach to it.27 The study argues 
that a distinction must be drawn from the out-
set between the risks "that make themselves 
apparent in the behaviour of the more generic 
—primarily macroeconomic— variables" and 
those "which arise out of changes in the structure 
of domestic prices and in the remuneration of 
the factors of production, as well as in the exist-
ing relations between earnings and prices". 
The two kinds of effect are obviously closely 
2r H. Assael, "The internationalization of the Latin 
American economics: some reservations", CEPAL Review, 
\ . °7<Apr i l 1979), pp. 41-55. 
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related, the latter being dependent upon the 
former in the main, although as they develop 
dynamically they reinforce each other. 
Within this overall picture one singularly 
important possibility is that the "open 
economy" approach may involve a very serious 
error of perspective inasmuch as it focuses ex-
cessively or solely on the significance of exter-
nal demand rather than the present or potential 
importance of the domestic market. 
We have already shown the actual relative 
importance of three factors in the past and es-
t imated their future weight. There can there-
fore be no doubt about the predominance of the 
domestic market, all the more so if its potential 
continues to be developed, as advocated in 
most official policies and patently justified on 
social and economic grounds. 
It should be pointed out immediately that 
this argument does not postulate a naïve or 
mutually exclusive contradiction between 
these two engines of growth or alternative pat-
terns of production activity. On the contrary, as 
was mentioned earlier, it is clear that they must 
be complementary, as has very often been the 
case in the past. 
However, the seeds of conflict, perhaps 
only relative but nonetheless important, do ex-
ist, as past experience shows. Frequently the 
extension of external links has not gone hand in 
hand with an equal strengthening (in relative 
and sometimes even in absolute terms) of the 
domest ic market and the production activities 
geared to it, with the consequences which have 
been fully documented in the literature on the 
question. 
Some examples show the cause of this pos-
sible or actual contradiction. 
(a) Investment and domestic demand 
T h e orientation of investment is an outstanding 
example in this respect. If the level of invest-
ment does not rise significantly, the preference 
for export-linked investment inevitably means 
that investment primarily or exclusively des-
t ined for the domestic market will decline in 
relative or absolute terms. 
Clearly, economic policy can and should 
guide the investment process —equally to av-
oid the opposing bias of neglecting investment 
in activities with some degree of export poten-
tial. But if instead policy is directed dispro-
portionately or excessively in the opposite di-
rection —despite doctrinaire proclamations on 
the non-involvement of the State— the cumula-
tive distortions maybe substantial within quite 
a short time.-8 
In addition, these latent or real pos-
sibilities are strengthened by the social impli-
cations of a change of policy which is very radi-
cal or lacks the necessary balance. 
The prevalence of the inward-looking 
approach was naturally accompanied by the 
priority objective of expanding the domestic 
market for the activities directed towards it, 
and social policy {on wages, subsidies, social 
security and so on) was geared to this end with 
all the limitations and shortcomings which can 
be attributed to such a state of affairs. 
Naturally enough, the alternative ap-
proach implies a more or less substantial 
change on this front, because its very nature is 
to give pride of place to external rather than 
domestic demand, above all in terms of the 
relative and dissimilar growth of each. Further-
more, since the level of earnings is a decisive 
e lement in external competitiveness, a rise in 
the former must by definition have a negative 
effect upon the latter. The broader implications 
are equally clear. Using the means at its dis-
posal, this policy will aim to hold down earn-
ings, while the approach focusing on the 
domestic market must simultaneously and 
primordially seek to increase the effective de-
mand for goods and services which is to be 
satisfied. 
Finally, it should be emphasized, as it is in 
Assael's study, that the interplay of incentives 
and disincentives in an injudicious export 
strategy may mean that "favourable conditions 
are generated or re-established for the opera-
tion of the traditional system of the interna-
28 It might be added that some legislation aimed at the 
unilateral promotion ot industrial and non-traditional ex-
ports may give rise to administrative and discriminatory 
problems, which have often been a feature ot legislation 
fostering import substitution activities. This has been sug-
gested, for example, in criticism of the legislation adopted 
by Peru in this field at the beginning of 1979. See the 
Informe Económico supplement to the newspaper El 
Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), for July 1979. 
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tional division of labour and of comparative 
advantages, in the orthodox sense". The lim-
ited or smaller importance placed on inward-
directed industrial development would seem 
to accentuate this tendency, while the en-
hanced opportunities in some primary bran-
ches would tend to encourage their falling into 
foreign hands, particularly in the case of min-
ing, because of the scale of the investment in-
volved and other well-known factors. 
(b) Imports and regional integration 
Still on a general level, it seems clear that 
these potential or emerging trends will be 
s trengthened if the export-oriented approach is 
combined with a determined or undiscriminat-
ing policy to free imports, either as a functional 
part of the open-economy ideology or as a 
means of tackling the problem of the occasional 
gluts of incoming foreing exchange. The sub-
stantial, and often undifferentiated cuts in 
tariffs and the rejection of other protectionist 
measures (such as import deposits or exchange 
rate management)211 and of progressive internal 
taxation are common elements in this approach. 
Repeating judgements quite widely ad-
vanced in the region during the past century in 
criticism of attempts at protection, it is argued 
that in this respect external openness pla-
ces within reach of ' the consumer' the goods 
and services offered in the industrialized 
economies with high average incomes. How-
ever, it is perfectly clear that many of these 
—precisely those for which the demand is most 
dynamic— are beyond the effective purchasing 
power of the majority of the population, whose 
income level only barely allows them to meet 
their basic needs. Of course, this is not to deny 
the 'trickledown effect' in the case of many 
- ! , This instrument, much used and abused in earlier 
t imes, has become an object of ideological execration 
whose equivalent in the opposite camp, might be said to b e 
currency devaluation. However, it seems clear that a very 
selective and limited differentiation of rates may be a use-
ful and expeditious instrument on many ocassions, particu-
larly in economies with appreciable structural heterogene-
ity —- for example, where the export sector (or its main 
branches) has much higher levels of productivity than the 
average level in the economy. This would also appear to be 
a very important aspect as regards the external projection of 
industrialization. 
goods of low unit value which abound in mod-
ern consumption (whether imported or not), 
but in this case it is important, not to underesti-
mate the possible distortions caused if this oc-
curs at the expense, absolutely or relatively, of 
expenditure on necessities. 
Finally, we cannot close this review with-
out referring to the negative effects on regional 
integration projects. 
Besides the many different domestic ob-
stacles which have affected its course, it is well 
known that the propitious winds of interna-
tional trade and the availability of abundant 
financial resources have also helped to douse 
the frame of integration, although -without in 
any way removing its deep-seaked historical 
raison d'être. Furthermore, in some countries 
these factors were compounded by the delib-
erate or implicit repercussions of the 'open 
economy' approach, despite the changes in the 
world economy since 1973 — a point to which 
we shall refer below. 
The opposition to the economic and gen-
eral logic of regional integration, which is only 
seen as a means of reproducing the errors of 
substitution industrialization in a broader con-
text, goes together with the rejection or elimi-
nation of incentives and machinery designed to 
promote it, such as the establishment of a com-
mon tariff towards the rest of the world, the 
well-harmonized preferential cut-back in 
duties on trade among members, and the joint 
planning of investment. 
(c) Repercussions on prices andwages 
From the other angle identified in this 
analysis, another salient point is the hypotheti-
cal or proven impact on the level and structure 
of prices and wages resulting from the injudi-
cious application of a policy of opening up to 
the exterior. 
As argued in the above-mentioned study, 
"domestic prices of goods ... tend to be as-
similated to world market quotations [and] are 
affected by the more extensive and expeditious 
export and import possibilities". However, 
" the trends that are generated in respect of the 
remuneration of profitability of the factor of 
production in the developing countries in pro-
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cess of internationalization are not so clearly 
defined".3" 
The difference in effect stems largely from 
the relative supply and cost of capital and 
labour, as well as the lower domestic or interna-
tional mobility of the latter, and these tend to 
accentuate the divergence. Thus forces are un-
leashed which produce a situation whose ex-
treme case has been described as "interna-
tional prices and domestic wages". 
Obviously, to emphasize these contrasts is 
not to postulate that the purchasing power of 
wage earners could be the same in all countries 
whatever their level of development or levels 
of productivity. What is clear is that some 
policies of external openness have increased 
the gap be tween wages and the prices of many 
essential products by bringing the latter up to 
international levels.31 Consequently, the 
factors which may cause losses in real wages 
are strengthened by changes of a regressive 
nature in the price system. What is more, it 
should not b e forgotten that in well-known 
cases this tendency is worsened by the (relative 
or absolute) drop in prices and greater avail-
ability of products for the higher-income groups 
as a result of the freeing of imports. 
This trend is also linked with the nature of 
the goods which make up the so-called-non-
traditional exports. Although this category var-
ies from country to country, as we shall see 
below, it is well known that many, and some-
times most, are agricultural goods and light in-
dustrial products (processed foods, clothing, 
footwear, etc.). It is therefore these products 
which suffer the strongest price impact, both 
because of the fact that external market prices 
are usually higher and because of the incen-
tives which they are given, all of which has a 
reflex effect on the domestic prices of these 
goods and of related products. An additional 
danger, which has materialized in some cases, 
is that the unbalanced emphasis on exportable 
agricultural products results in a decline, or 
slow growth of crops for domestic consump-
tion. 
These effects become even more serious if 
a significant or increased proportion of imports 
consists of non-essential or luxury articles. In a 
word, a growing proportion of wage goods is 
being exchanged for others primarily or exclu-
sively destined for the top income groups. 
In short, then, through these and other 
channels an unfettered opening-up of the econ-
omy runs the risk of re-establishing, creating or 
deepening economic and social features which 
have long been criticized in Latin America, and 
the correction of which is a priority objective of 
most official policies proclaimed in the region, 
sometimes even in the very countries which 
appear to be taking a different road. 
Il l 
Options and problems 
1. The role of industrial exports 
If we now return to the premises set forth at the 
beginning of this article, it is easy to see that to 
secure a dynamic, synchronized rate of growth 
of foreign trade calls for policies that can avoid 
what have been described as the dangers of 
openness as well as the difficulties that have 
arisen in the past. In other words, the process of 
internationalization should be placed on foun-
dations which allow a different, more favour-
able and more dynamic insertion in the world 
economy. 
3<) Assael, op. cit., p . 50. 
" A defender of such policies, besides confusing the 
sense of the contrast described above by arguing that it 
overlooks the manifest and inevitable differences in real 
incomes be tween the countries compared, recognizes "that 
for many ductules our prices were below international 
levels" and adds elsewhere that "in general prices in Chile 
are similar to or even often above international levels due 
to the openness of our economy to foreign trade" (our 
underlining). Rolf Lüders, "Precios internacionales y 
sueldos chilenos", in the Santiago newspaper La Tercera 
de la Hora, S August 1979; the article was a reply to an 
article by the sociologist Pablo Huneens, "Precios y 
prices", ibid., 23 July 1979. 
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It goes without saying that an approach to 
this issue must cover all of its many dimen-
sions, some of which do not lie within the 
economic sphere but are nonetheless ex-
tremely important. Even within that sphere, it 
will not be possible to deal with all its aspects, 
al though some of them, such as the attitude to 
imports, have been outlined above. Others, 
such as the problem of indebtedness, cannot be 
examined here, and in any event there is an 
abundance of recent literature on the question. 
Instead we shall focus on what emerges as 
the crucial issue in the discussion, namely, the 
role of manufactured exports. These combine 
two very important functions: first, they facili-
tate and promote the continued development 
of the industrialization process, expanding its 
domestic and external underpinning; and sec-
ondly, they alter the 'outdated model ' of the 
international division of labour, the main lines 
of which still exist in the relationship between 
centre and periphery. 
(a) The differential prospect of exporta 
First of all, an obvious question must be 
asked: why single out manufactured exports? 
Do not basic commodities offer similar or bet-
ter opportunities? 
Without returning to the past record, 
which speaks for itself, a convincing reply is 
given by World Bank data on the prospects for 
world exports. As shown in table 4, the projec-
tions of the probable evolution of the compo-
nents of world exports between 1975 and 1985 
suggest that manufactured exports will far out-
strip all others, thus continuing the trend re-
corded in the period 1960-1975. With regard to 
the less developed countries, the growth rates 
will be much more differentiated than in the 
case of the world average, and there will again 
be a growth rate of slightly over 12% annually. 
Consequently, by 1985 43% of the exports of 
those economies will consist of manufactures, 
which will account for 64% of the rise in their 
sales between 1975 and 1985. 
To round off this picture, table 5 compares 
the growth rates of the volume of the main 
agricultural and mining exports —excluding 
oil— in the years 1960-1976 and gives esti-
mates to 1990. The breakdown by products 
gives a better view of the more global trends 
presented in table 4. 
Needless, to say, this is not to underesti-
mate the present and future importance of com-
modity exports, particularly for Latin America 
as a whole and above all in the case of the 
countries where there are good prospects of 
Table 4 
PAST AND PROJECTED GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT GROUPS 
{In 1975 dollars) 
Less Less 
developed developed Percentage of exports of Percentage share 
World countries World countries less developed countries of increment 





























































Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1978, Washington, tables 13 and 25, and unpublished projections 
prepared for the same reports. 
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increasing these exports or where industrial-
ization is still in its early stages and needs more 
complex support, such as that provided by sub-
regional integration, 
value of exports fell from 49% in 1960 to 18% in 
1974.32 
(b) Industrialization and manufacture d 
exports 
Table 5 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PAST AND PRO-
JECTED GROWTH OF THE VOLUME OF THE 
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Source: World Bank, Division of Commodity and Export 
Projections. 
a No year is entirely representative because of price fluctua-
tions; for example, in 1975 copper and phosphate prices 
were exceptionally high. 
b Historical trend. 
e1961-1976. 
d 1955-1976. 
eGrowth rates refer to all cereals. 
1961-1963/1976. 
In this connexion it is worth drawing atten-
tion to the widespread progress made in the 
diversification of commodity exports. Accord-
ing to a study of 55 non-oil-exporting econo-
mies, the proportion of countries dependent on 
one commodity for more than half of the total 
Resuming a discussion which began when 
examining the varieties of opening up to the 
exterior, it is now necessary to stress the 
symbiotic relationship between industrializa-
tion and manufactured exports. As was sug-
gested above, such exports are essentially a 
means of obtaining the 'lubricant' (imports) 
needed to continue with the process of in-
dustrialization in its broadest sense, and of ex-
panding the market so that the process can be 
more dynamic, profound and economically 
efficient. 
In other words, export-oriented openness, 
far from being a break or volte-face with respect 
to past industrialization, should be viewed —to 
paraphrase Von Clausewitz's famous apho-
rism33— as the continuation of industrialization 
by more propitious and historically necessary 
means. 
The other side of the coin is even clearer. If 
it is considered possible and necessary to ex-
pand manufacturing exports in future, how can 
this be done without maintaining or strength-
ening the industrial development capable of 
generating the goods in question? 
All of this should of course be viewed in a 
context in which, as we have already seen, pre-
sent and future demand in the domestic 
markets will continue to require the steady, 
preferential growth of manufacturing supply, 
of which it is at the same time the main or at 
least a significant support (as the case may be). 
The emphasis placed on these aspects may 
appear excessive bearing in mind that nowa-
days nobody is in principle against industrial-
ization. Even the extreme orthodox ideological 
current has moderated its previous total anti-
pathy, which nonetheless remains consider-
able. However, the heavy one-sided emphasis 
32 H. B. Chenery and D. B. Keesing, The Changing 
Composition of Developing Country Exports, World De-
velopment Report, Washington, Background Paper, N," 5, 
1978. 
33 "War is nothing but a continuation of political in-
tercourse with the admixture of different means." 
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placed on export promotion and the subjection 
of the manufacturing process to the rigorous 
satisfaction of the rules of international 'com-
petitiveness' intrinsically involves self-im-
posed constraints upon its development and 
its hierarchical, functional relationship with 
the other objective. 
In brief, then, the false choice between 
inward-looking and outward-looking indus-
trialization (or between earning foreing ex-
change from exports and saving it for other, 
more suitable purposes by producing for the 
domestic market) is resolved by blending the 
two options, which rather than being mutually 
exclusive in fact strengthen each other within 
the framework of the overall diversification and 
expansion of manufacturing. Thus an advance 
along the lines of inward-directed industrial-
ization may have as its direct or indirect conse-
quence an immediate or future rise in exports 
(as has usually been the case), and progress in 
exporting may also stimulate inward-directed 
industrialization as a result of its forward or 
backward linkages (as has also occurred in 
other cases).*1 
The harmonization and ranking of these 
factors raises complex and to some extent novel 
problems for development and industrializa-
tion policies, which have led to different formal 
or informal forms of planning and of State in-
tervention. The 'invisible hand' or absolute 
free play of market forces has been relegated to 
the limbo of pseudo-academic abstraction.35 
The real discussion is in fact confined to weigh-
ing up the respective roles of planning (or the 
deliberateness of economic policy) and of the 
market, to the relationship between these two 
determinants of the allocation of resources and, 
above all, to the nature of the economic and 
social objectives pursued. 
Clearly, we cannot discuss here all these 
aspects which together constitute the bulk of an 
:i4 See Finto, op. cit. 
3 5This is also true of the industrial-exporting econom-
ies of Asia and those which apply radical policies of exter-
nal openness . In fact all of them use a battery of conven-
tional and unorthodox instruments to stimulate their out-
ward-directed development; what is difficult to find in 
these cases is the integration of these provisions (which are 
sometimes in themselves positive) within the overall con-
text of the economy and the development of industrializa-
tion. 
industrialization strategy.36 Limiting ourselves 
to the issue under consideration in this section, 
the following statement from a CEPAL docu-
ment referred to earlier may be taken as a 
guideline: 
"In brief, unless the development policy 
changes sufficiently to boost manufacturing ex-
ports still further and at the same time achieve 
an active and efficient substitution of imports 
in the less developed sectors, it will be difficult 
to modify the structural characteristics hinder-
ing the development of the Latin American 
economy."37 
In another apposite summary, an eminent 
Peruvian economist couched the dilemma in 
the following terms: 
"Either industry begins to generate its 
own foreign exchange earnings in order to sup-
port its high rate of growth, or the rate of growth 
of industry and thereby of the economy as a 
whole must slow down to the rate of increase 
permitted by the availability of foreign ex-
change, i.e., roughly to the rate of growth of 
primary production."3" 
(c) A digression on substitutive 
industrialization 
At the risk of interrupting the thread of our 
argument, it is necessary to pause here to intro-
duce an issue closely linked with the question 
under discussion which we have deliberately 
left aside. We are referring to the controversial 
question of what is known as substitutive in-
dustrialization. For some, as is well known, this 
form or aspect of Latin American growth is a 
kind of 'original sin' which has fortunately fal-
len not only into disrepute but also into disuse. 
Others, on the other hand, are perhaps more 
3 6See in this regard "Analysis and prospects of Latin 
American industrial development" (ST/CEPAL/CONF. 
69/L.2), submitted to the Second Latin American Confer-
ence on Industrialization, held in Cali, Colombia in 
September 1979. 
'*' "Las exportaciones manufactureras de America 
Latina: experiencias y problemas", by Angel Monti, with 
comments bv Norberto González, in "Políticas de promo-
ción de exportaciones", vol. I (E/CEPAL/1046), p. 12. 
liH Daniel M. Schydlowsky, "Policymaking for national 
economic growth", in Luigi R. Einaudi, éd., Latin America 
in the 1970s (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 
1972), pp. 100-101. 
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understanding about its origins and functions, 
but sometimes entertain comprehensible 
doubts about its present significance and valid-
ity 
An albeit cursory discussion of the ques-
tion is therefore worth while in order to single 
out some points which may be useful for the 
general discussion. 
Without reviewing here what has actually 
been proposed on this question in the literature 
of CEPAL,3 ' ' it should be stated at the outset 
that essentially the concept has a historical 
connotation: in other words, it is set in a 
particular time and place, primarily that of the 
relatively more developed economies of the 
region in the period roughly ranging from the 
Great Depression to the early 1950s. This is the 
true setting in which substitutive industrializa-
tion took place — and CEPAL did not invent it 
bu t merely incorporated it in its analysis and 
diagnosis of the regional economy. 
What was its raison d'être? That the con-
straints of the external sector forced or induced 
domestic supply to meet the demand that could 
no longer be satisfied by imports (which were 
insufficient and had been reallocated to higher-
priority ends) and which also represented a 
market which was safe, known and within the 
reach of the real human and financial capacities 
of the existing enterprises. This is the context of 
the phase of 'easy substitution' in the general 
framework of inward-directed development. 
T h e situation tended to change steadily 
and substantially in the course of the 1950s. In 
addition to the more obvious obstacles such as 
economies of scale, market size and technologi-
cal and financial requirements, there was the 
paramount factor that the attractive potential 
and opportunities stemming from existing de-
mand were relatively exhausted. Thus it was no 
longer mainly a question of replacing existing 
imports by national production but rather of 
anticipating and in fact creating (by the demon-
stration effect, consumer credit, advertising 
w See, for example. En Torno a las ¡deas de la CEPAL: 
Desarrollo, Industrialización y Comercio Exterior, op. cit., 
¡iiid En Tomo a las ideas de la CEPAL; Problemas de la 
Industrialización en América Latina, op. cit. See also "The 
growth and decline of import substitution in Brazil", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. IX, N.° I (March 
1964), pp. 1-59. 
and so forth) a demand for goods neither pro-
duced nor imported, except in small quantities 
which fluctuated in accordance with the 
varying supply of foreign exchange. This is the 
picture wich characterized the second stage, 
wrongly labelled 'difficult substitution since 
essentially it was not filling a void left by the 
restriction or elimintion of imports which 
satisfied a pre-existing market. In other words, 
it would be better to speak instead of'difficult 
industrialization' to define the subsequent 
period which, in any event, also followed the 
general approach of inward-looking develop-
ment, i.e., directed towards and based upon the 
domestic market. 
The example of the motor-vehicle industry, 
or of 'heavy' or dearer durable goods, takes us to 
the heart of the matter, although citing them in 
no way implies any judgement on their level 
of priority or significance. For well-known 
reasons, even in the larger countries (perhaps 
with the relative exception of Mexico because 
of its more liberal import policies) the above-
mentioned problems have made it difficult to 
respond to the latent or embryonic demand for 
such goods either through imports or through 
domestic production. Since the first path was 
closed or very narrow, only the second re-
mained, primarily opened up by the transna-
tional corporations. It is they, and in other 
fields the State or large national consortia, 
which broke the barriers of 'difficult in-
dustrialization' that did not fundamentally in-
volve import substitution, except in contrast 
with a hypothetical, non-existent alternative, 
i.e., the satisfaction of that demand by pur-
chases abroad. To hammer home this point, it is 
obvious that following such a path Brazil could 
never have imported annually nearly one mil-
lion motor vehicles — its output in recent years. 
In sum, then, substitution proper becomes 
relatively less important as inward-directed in-
dustrialization advances and now begins also to 
be directed outwards as part of its growth effort 
and of the general requirements of develop-
ment. 
But the fact that the role of industrializa-
tion via import substitution has diminished 
does not mean that it has become obsolete or 
invalid. Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. As shown by the experience of some 
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economies of the region, the advance of man-
ufacturing and of overall growth also cre-
ates and increases the demand for imports 
—primarily of capital goods and basic inputs— 
and thus makes it possible or necessary to em-
bark on their substitution at the national or re-
gional level in view of the growing need for 
foreign exchange which it is difficult to satisfy 
because of competing demands or the limita-
tions of the external accounts. This variant 
of substitutive industrialization therefore re-
mains valid, although without the decisive im-
portance it had in the past, and within a new 
general context. 
Of course, the problem presents different 
features from country to country, as we have 
seen, and the relative emphasis placed on the 
above approaches varies, but this does not de-
tract from the validity of our general position. 
Thus substitution proper, diversification aimed 
at an emerging or anticipated market and rela-
tions with the exterior —the region or the rest of 
the world— are so many aspects of the general 
effort to promote industrialization and forge 
links with the world economy. 
We shall now continue dealing with the 
questions raised before this digression. 
2. Criticism of the possibilities of a 
new insertion 
While there is no shortage of observers who 
express doubts and reservations concerning 
the prospects for the achievement of a new 
form of insertion in the international economy, 
there are others who are critical from the oppo-
site angle: in other words, they accept the pos-
sibility of a change in the pattern of trade, but 
do not consider that it would benefit the 
periphery. In the words of one of the spokes-
men of this current, world-market-oriented 
industrialization does not brake but rather 
perpetuates the historic process of dependent, 
unequal development of the countries of Afri-
ca, Asia and Latin America.40 Repeating this 
idea, another author defines and broadens it as 
4UOtto Freyer, World Market Oriented Industrializa-
tion of Developing Countries: Free Production Zones and 
World Market-Factories (Federal Republic of Germany, 
Max Planck Institute, 1977}, as quoted in Vuskovic, op. cit.. 
follows: so long as the industrial exports of the 
periphery take place on capitalist terms of trade 
and still more within the framework of the new 
patterns of capitalist accumulation, they will 
ccjntinue to be a mechanism for the external 
expropriation of surpluses, of unbalanced and 
unfair trade.41 
These opinions may cause some surprise 
since they appear to forget the age-old comp-
laint of the periphery about its commodity-
exporting status, in addition to ruling out one of 
the central objectives of the new international 
order. When all is said and done, this may be 
considered another variety of the 'disaster' view-
point, in which any possible change turns out 
worse than the existing situation unless it con-
forms to other rules which are rarely defined 
with any degree of depth. 
Of course, this risk does not escape the 
attention of the more alert proponents. Thus, 
one of them remarks that his approach does not 
mean that he underestimates the importance of 
any process of export diversification, and still 
less should it be viewed as an expression of 
yearning for the old forms of world trade and of 
the international division of labour.42 
In fact, these proponents base their criti-
cism and warnings both on some specific forms 
of opening up to the exterior (such as those 
linked to assembly industries or 'free zones') 
and also, in other cases, on the nature of the 
more orthodox or 'ideological' policies re-
viewed above. 
However, there are more general ques-
tions which transcend those aspects and have 
considerable significance for the topic of this 
study. 
(a) Nature of industrial exports 
One of these —as mentioned earlier— con-
cerns the nature of the manufactured goods 
which have in the recent past constituted the 
main means of entering the central markets, 
i.e., non-durable consumer goods. 
The criticism on this subject is well known 
4 1 P . Vuskovic, "America Latina ante nuevos términos 
de la división internacional del trabajo", Economía de 
América Latina (Mexico City), No. 2, March 1979. 
4Hbid. 
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and hi'ghly respectable, and ranges from the 
lower technological sophistication and low de-
mand elasticity of such products to the possible 
effects on supply and prices in the countries of 
origin — a matter on which we commented 
earlier. Furthermore, from a dynamic stand-
point, there is concern about the possible freez-
ing of a pattern of trade which would reserve a 
place for the periphery only or primarily in 
those branches of manufacturing, with all the 
relative disadvantages and limitations this 
would imply. 
Two aspects of the problem should be dis-
t inguished here: this path may be the most ac-
cessible in order for a developing country "to 
be able to enter the export market"; but this 
does not prevent it from continuing to diversify 
towards activities with greater technological 
potential and more dynamic demand.43 
In fact this has been verified in a number of 
countries recently, although naturally it is 
strongest and most prevalent in the more in-
dustrialized countries. Thus between 1965 and 
1975, for example, Brazilian and Argentinian 
exports of capital goods increased their share of 
total manufacturing exports from 16.8% to 
25.4% and from 14.7% to 18% respectively.44 
Naturally, this trend or possibility is by no 
means necessary or inevitable, and it would be 
naïve to underestimate the obstacles standing 
in its way, which will very often call for the 
intermediation of regional groupings, as will be 
4 a T h i s concern has also been shown by economists of 
the centres , as may be seen from the following passage from 
a major article on the question: 
"A serious approach to increasing the international 
division of labour in manufactures through foreign trade 
must adopt a more dynamic and longer-term point of view 
than current comparative advantages if the developed 
countries do not wish to be accused of a new wave of 
neocolonialism. 
"While concentrating on labour-intensive products 
may b e the only path by which a developing country can 
enter the export market, the earnings obtained from rising 
incomes should be invested in modifying the structure of 
exports. In the long term, the industries in which tech-
nological progress and future growth are highest must be 
widely distributed among all countries, developed or not, 
in line with the new lines of comparative advantage, just as 
they are currently distributed among the developed 
countries." Hollis Chenery, "La división internacional de 
la fuerza de trabajo: el ejemplo en la industria", El 
Trimestre Econômico, (Mexico City), N." 155 (July-
September 1972). 
44 Chenery and Keesing, op. cit. 
argued below. However, it would be even 
more mistaken to view it as a cul-de-sac. 
Furthermore, it is worth stressing the 
historical perspective of the problem. As a gen-
eral rule, and for obvious reasons, the industrial 
late-comers entered foreign trade not through 
the faster-growing, more sophisticated ac-
tivities bu t through relatively simple man-
ufactures accessible to their stock of human and 
material capacities.45 
Consequently, it is historically groundless 
and to some extent naive to suppose that the 
periphery could immediately launch its man-
ufactures exports in the branches that are tech-
nologically most complex and are decisively 
affected by factors such as economies of scale 
and entrepreneurial and State organization, 
which must be created gradually, often through 
the actual links with the world or regional 
markets themselves. 
To close this discussion, and remembering 
the many allusions to the effect of the capitalist 
setting, it may be worth bearing in mind that 
the traditional or emerging trade structures also 
occur in relations between the periphery and 
the socialist countries, and also to a lesser ex-
tent among the latter. Thus most exports from 
the periphery to the socialist countries consist 
of commodities and light manufactures, and 
among the latter it is primarily the more in-
dustrialized economies which export the tech-
nologically more advanced products. Natur-
ally, all this takes place within a setting of 
growth and change of those relations.41' 
45 The most conspicuous example is that of Japan, 
which has been described as follows in a well-known 
study: Japan first imported manufactures from more de-
veloped countries, then began to produce domestic substi-
tutes, and finally managed to become an exporter of those 
products. At first, Japanese exports of manufactured pro-
ducts tended to go to countries which were less developed 
than Japan itself. Subsequently, it was capable of exporting 
to industrially more advanced countries, as its labour force 
became more skilled and experienced, the quality of its 
products improved and the commercial skills of its 
businessmen became more sophisticated. (S. H. Robock, 
"Una dicotomía falsa: industrialización a través de sustitu-
ción de importaciones o mediante industrias de exporta-
ción", El Trimestre Económico (Mexico City), N." 159.) 
4 6This statement is substantiated by examining the 
composition of the Soviet Union's imports from developing 
countries. According to "Trade relations among countries 
having different economic and social systems", prepared 
by the UNCTAD secretariat in July 1978, traditional items, 
including a variety of manufactured articles, made up more 
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(b) The problem of wage levels 
The second objection in this field relates to 
the levels of remuneration in the export in-
dustries of the periphery. It is argued that these 
entail conditions of'superexploitation', which 
are moreover a fundamental requirement for 
their development, with a number of under-
standable social and economic internal and ex-
ternal repercussions. , r 
The existence of this problem cannot be 
denied, and to illustrate it some deplorable ex-
amples have been given of how in some places 
the low level of wages is emphasized as an 
incentive for attracting investment, above all 
from abroad to 'industrial free zones'.iH 
However, in a proper appraisal of the ques-
tion other considerations mentioned earlier in 
another context (see section 3 (c) above) must 
be taken into account. 
Of course, the relative lowness of wages in 
the periphery is one of the main reasons for the 
viability of manufactured exports, in conjunc-
tion with other equally important factors such 
as the general level of development and size of 
the domestic market, resource endowment, 
geographical position, policies followed, and 
so on. These differences have always had some 
effect on the development of the international 
division of labour and of industry, by smooth-
ing the way for newcomers to the manufactur-
ing 'club'.49 However, they have never been 
decisive, and therefore investment and indus-
trialization have continued to be concentrated 
in the nucleus of central countries, in other 
words, where wage levels are highest. 
than 82% of the total in 1975-1976, the remainder being 
made up of chemicals, machinery and transport equipment 
and manufactured articles (SITC section 6). 
4 7 The concept of 'superexploitation' has a double 
meaning in the literature in which ¡t is used: one is absolute 
and refers to the physical hardship of the work involved and 
the extremely poor conditions of subsistence; the other is 
relative and refers to the extremely unfair distribution of 
the value created by the labour force (between the latter 
and the owners of the means of production). In other words, 
a wage earner may be 'superexploited' from one standpoint 
or the other, or both at once, The lack of precision in the use 
of the concept makes it ambiguous, all the more so since the 
meanings are historically relative. 
l f iFreyer, o/>. cit. 
w As is well known, the United States is the great ex-
ception to this rule. The relative shortage of labour, the 
The question becomes still clearer if one 
starts from the explicit or implicit (for lack of an 
alternative statement) proposal that wages in 
the export industries should be the same as 
those prevailing in the developed centres. 
Apart from the obvious obstacles such a situa-
tion would involve for international or regional 
competitiveness, it would also greatly increase 
structural heterogeneity (including of course 
social inequality) in the periphery, inasmuch as 
it would cause technical progress to be still 
more concentrated in that segment of the pro-
duction structure, thus further hindering its 
spread throughout the economic and social 
structure (even with the necessary priorities). 
In a sense, it would involve establishing a de-
veloped enclave within an overall peripheral 
situation which would continue with average 
levels ofremuneration and productivity merely 
a fraction of those of the industrialized econ-
omies; not to mention the relegation of the 
population and activities stagnating in the so-
called 'primitive' strata. 
In fact, paradoxically this argument tends 
to coincide with the orthodox approaches start-
ing from a different standpoint. While the latter 
argue that industrialization in general and ex-
port activities in particular should meet interna-
tional standards of efficiency, competitiveness 
and prices (and also wages, although this is a 
desideratum to be achieved at some indefinite 
point in the future), this approach sanctions 
manufacturing exports only if wage levels are 
on a par with those of the central economies. 
A glance at CEPAL writings on the op-
tions raised by industrialization may be useful 
for shedding light on this problem.5" In brief, 
CEPAL argued that international comparabil-
ity should not be a guiding element in deci-
sions on this process, since the latter is subject 
to a number of internal and external considera-
abundance of natural resources and other factors led to a 
relatively high wage level from the outset, which in turn 
spurred the advance and spread of technology. It must be 
stressed, however, that these circumstances have not recur-
red in the great majority of cases. 
"*" See, for example, R. Prebisch, "Theoretical and prac-
tical problems of economic growth" (E/CN. 12/22 l),and En 
torno a las ideas de la CEPAL; Problemas de la industriali-
zación en America Latina, op. cit. 
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tions —absorption of redundant labour; neces-
sary impact of the introduction of technical 
progress on primary activities; effects on the 
external sector and terms of trade, general 
training, etc. Thus the decisions to be made in 
the process involve weighing up these ele-
ments and the relative advantages in the alloca-
tion of resources which are identified and as-
sessed. 
Paraphrasing this general argument, it 
could be maintained that the essential point as 
far as wages are concerned does not lie in the 
comparison of absolute levels between the pe-
riphery and the centre but rather in a compari-
son of levels within the developing economies. 
In other words, they might be lower in the 
periphery than in the centres, but what really 
matters is the relationship between wages paid 
in export industries and those typical of the 
peripheral economies as a whole, or, from a 
narrower standpoint, in comparable activi-
ties.51 
This question clearly raises other prob-
lems which cannot be side-stepped. Chief 
among these are issues relating to the distribu-
tion of the income generated by the export sec-
tor. Let us assume that due to various factors 
—relatively low wages, incentives provided, 
creation or expansion of foreign markets and so 
on— a substantial surplus is created or increas-
ed. What happens to it? How is it distributed 
be tween the labour force, enterprises (national 
or foreign) and the State? Or in the case of a 
State-owned enterprise, between the State and 
the workers? 
Some extreme replies may be imagined 
from the standpoint of the alternative doc-
trines. For some, the surplus should be absorb-
ed by the labour force, with the deliberate or de 
facto purpose of raising wages to international 
levels, whereas for others it seems necessary, 
in the interests of competitiveness and of the 
requirements of accumulation, that the profits 
should go primarily to the owners of capital, 
11 There is no need to consider open or disguised un-
employment, because this would be to take the hypothesis 
to mi extreme. However, when studying the options of 
i ndustrialization it has usually been considered that the use 
of i die human or material resources is an important factor in 
deciding on the economic and social justification of ac-
tivities which do not satisfy orthodox canons. 
while wage rises should be held down to the 
lowest socially and politically acceptable level 
—although in the abstract it is also postulated 
that they should rise to international levels. 
In both cases, it should be noticed, the 
surplus would fundamentally go to the private 
sector —except for the Treasury's usual share. 
In both cases, the productivity of labour or of 
capital is used to justify these aspirations. In 
addition, it seems clear that these are 'micro-
economic' approaches in the sense that worker-
enterprise relations are considered outside the 
global context of the system and its interrela-
tions. The conflict of interests and classes is 
individualized or particularized, even though 
in the political formulation it is seen as a collec-
tive matter. 
Hence these two extreme perspectives 
—which of course have their nuances and qual-
ifications— neglect or understimate the social 
origin and component of surpluses, and, if you 
like, of much of the profits or value added. This 
component stems from a number of" different 
sources, ranging from the myriad influences of 
economic policy and politics to the significant 
contribution of the national heritage —re-
source endowment, accumulated know-how, 
inherited infrastructure, and so forth.''2 
When this collective dimension is taken 
into account and weighed in the balance, it 
becomes less difficult to answer the question 
raised above. The heart of the matter is that the 
opposing claims of the labour force and of the 
owners/entrepreneurs must be harmonized 
with the social appropriation and use of some of 
the value created, a process which in all known 
capitalist and socialist systems takes place 
through the State (all the more so, obviously, in 
the ease of State-owned or controlled enter-
prises). To some extent, this corresponds to 
what Raúl Prebisch has called the "socializa-
tion of the surplus", although the concept has 
other connotations in his work.53 
From the narrower viewpoint of this dis-
cussion, that approach would mean, roughly 
5 2See in this regard A. Pinto, "Concentración del pro-
greso técnico y de sus frutos en el desarrollo latinoameri-
cano", El Trimestre Económico, No. 125. 
' ^ S e e his articles on peripheral capitalism in issues 1, 
6, 7 and 10 of the CEPAL Review. 
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speaking, that the levels and margins of wages 
and profits in export industries should not de-
part very far from the 'historical' and representa-
tive (i.e., more or less average) levels of the 
economy in which they are rooted, without pre-
judice to the preferential and qualified situa-
tions which might be created temporarily for 
their development or in the light of exceptional 
circumstances (for example, dangerous work, 
inhospitable location, etc.). Naturally, these 
general rules will inevitably be conditioned by 
the balance of power among the protagonists in-
volved. Nevertheless, this does not negate the 
possible usefulness of this approach as an al-
ternative to the simplifications or errors of the 
traditional approaches. 
In brief, 'superexploitation' or the private 
retention (by entrepreneurs or wage earners) of 
the profits from the activities in question 
(whether or not their aim is to lead to equiva-
lence with the industrialized economies or the 
international market) represent extreme op-
tions which may not necessarily exist in fact 
— and this is what has actually happened. Often 
the profits and wages of the export industries 
are above the average levels of the system and 
sometimes above those prevailing in the mod-
ern sector. However, it is usually also the case 
that direct or indirect fiscal action makes it pos-
sible to redistribute part of this surplus to the 
community, particularly if the activities are 
State-owned. 
3. Regional props 
Following this cursory review of some aspects 
of the state of supply and demand which affect 
the goal of 'industrializing' exports, mention 
must now be made of other more general fac-
tors. 
The first of these is the present and above 
all the potential importance of regional and 
subregional trade in Latin America/14 
There is no need to review the theoretical 
and practical work of CEPAL in this field. As is 
well known, in the early 1950s it began stres-
sing the need to progress beyond a form of 
^ I t has not been possible to discuss here the question 
of 'horizontal co-operation' among countries of the pe-
riphery. 
industrialization based on 'watertight compart-
ments ' as Raúl Prebisch put it. This was no 
doubt the first call for greater opennes, which 
combined the need to continue the process in a 
broader, more favourable framéw-ark, boost 
manufactured exports and lay more solid found-
dations for directing the process towards the 
world market. 
There is little doubt that the inherent dif-
ficulties in the road towards this objective were 
compounded in the mid-1960s by the relative 
easing of the external bottleneck, either be-
cause of the better performance of some com-
modity exports or due to the larger inflow of 
foreign credit. There are good reasons for main-
taining that the latter was at least as important 
as the former, if not more so, in damping the 
drive towards integration. 
The changes in the international setting 
during the present decade, and particularly the 
loss of dynamism of the central economies, may 
in some degree re-establish the priority of re-
gional trade, which has continued to grow at a 
satisfactory rate. But it would be mistaken to 
assume that only a major external bottleneck 
could stimulate that trade. What is most signif-
icant is that the development of industrializa-
tion and the volume and growing needs of im-
ports have opened promising horizons for re-
ciprocal trade within the region. 
Another point is that certain orthodox ap-
proaches claim to see some incompatibility be-
tween promoting regional agreements and tak-
ing advantage of the opportunities offered by 
international trade. The opposite view would 
appear to be better founded, however: i.e., that 
by affecting the speed of the process and the 
advance in product lines with greater export 
potential, progress in the first of" these direc-
tions helps to create a more solid platform for 
seizing those opportunities. At least, this is 
what is suggested by experience in this field 
elsewhere, such as the E E C and the socialist 
bloc in Europe. 
It is quite clear that the imperatives here 
vary according to the size of the domestic 
markets and other factors, but this does not 
warrant the deduction that the larger econ-
omies could remain indifferent to the potential 
of regional trade, especially since they have 
better possibilities of benefiting from it and 
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their absolute dimensions are relatively small 
in comparison with the main industrial econ-
omies. For the smaller economies, on the other 
hand, membership in larger economic group-
ings enjoying reciprocal preferences seems to 
be an absolute sine qua non tor the advance of 
their industrialization and their external sec-
tors, despite the fact that such links present 
major difficulties precisely due to the more in-
cipient state of that process. 
Be that as it may, regional integration 
stands out as an essential ingredient of the 
industrial-exporting strategy in that it limits 
risks, increases opportunities and reduces de-
pendence on the central economies. 
4. The role of the transnationals 
What part can or should the transnational cor-
porations have in the effort to change the pe-
riphery's position in the world economy? 
This issue is crucial to the matter, due to 
the dominant and often exclusive position of 
these corporations in the technologically moré 
sophisticated industries which have the best 
external and domestic demand prospects. In 
other words, the chances of qualitatively diver-
sifying the structure of manufacturing exports 
depend to a high degree on the part played by 
the transnational corporations, at least within 
the present context. 
Past experience in this respect shows 
clearly that they have concentrated on the 
domestic market and that their propensity to 
import is far greater than their contribution to 
exports. In addition, it is equally well known 
that intrafimi transactions predominate in both 
these flows, thus giving rise to transfer pricing 
and other well documented shortcomings. 
Various studies have shed light on this 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , 5 5 a l t h o u g h s a t i s f a c t o r y o r c o m p -
a s e e , tor exampie, UNCTAD, "Transnational corpo-
rations and expansion of trade in manufactures and semi-
manufactures: the role of transnational corporations in the 
marketing and distribution of exports and imports oí 
developing countries" (TD/B/C.2/197); UNCTAD, Dom-
inant Positions of Market Power of Transnational Corpo-
rations; Use of the Transfer Pricing Mechanisms (United 
Nations publications, Sales No.: E.78.II.D.9); and C. Vait-
sos, "World industrial development and the transnational 
enterprises: the Lima target as viewed by economic actors" 
(Sussex University, mimeo, 1978). 
lete data are not available. For the purposes of 
this study it may suffice to consider the data in 
table 6, although these refer only to the man-
ufactured exports of United States corpo-
rations. 
As is perfectly clear, the bulk of these ex-
ports is directed towards the other central econ-
omies, and this also represents an appreciable 
percentage of the corporations' total sales. This 
figure is again high for the group of countries of 
Asia and the Pacific whose industrialization 
was developed on the basis of the external 
market. The picture is very different for Latin 
America, however. While current values rose 
appreciably between 1966 and 1974, their ab-
solute level is low (US$ 1,421 million com-
pared with total exports of some US$ 40 billion 
in 1974), as is the percentage this represents of 
their global sales (less than 7% in 1974), which 
are primarily directed to domestic markets, as 
was emphasized a b o v e * 
Some researchers in this field, such as C. 
Vaitsos, are sceptical about any change in these 
relations. He argues that, at least in the medium 
term, it is unlikely that the transnational corpo-
rations will make a major contribution to the 
world redeployment of manufacturing activi-
ties through strong exports from the less de-
veloped countries. He believes instead that 
their major role will continue to be in import-
substitution manufacturing activities in those 
countries.57 
Without insisting on the interrelations and 
possible reciprocal reinforcement of these two 
approaches, it is worth recalling some of the 
progress made in involving the transnational 
corporations in the export drive. As is pointed 
out in a study referred to earlier, "in recent years 
... exports by TNCs of industrial goods have 
become sizable, in part because developing 
countries have been bringing pressure to bear 
on transnational corporations to export more; in 
some cases the achievment of specified export 
levels has been made a condition for permis-
sion to expand plant and to import goods. In the 
case of new entrants in the industry concerned 
The higher figure in the case of Argentina appears to 
be due to exports of transport equipment to other Latin 
American countries, including Cuba. 
5 'Vaitos, op. cit-
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Table 6 
MANUFACTURING EXPORTS BY FOREIGN" SUBSIDIARIES OF UNITED STATES 
CORPORATIONS IN 1966 AND 1974 
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Source: Bureau oí Economic Analysis ot the United States Department oí'Commerce, Survey of Current Business, vol. 56, 
No. 5 (May 1976), pp. 25-34. 
¡1 Majority control. 
and in other import-substitution activities, 
prior commitments concerning exports have 
also been required".5** 
Bearing these observations in mind, it is 
worth noting that not too long ago —even as late 
as the mid-1960s— it was difficult to find Latin 
American manufactured products, particularly 
equ ipmen t and machinery, in the markets of 
the region. Furthermore, various cases were 
known in which the parent companies of inter-
national corporations had actually prevented 
such exports. 
There is no need to stress that this panora-
ma has changed substantially. Unquestionably, 
the exports of the larger and more industrial-
ized countries continue to predominate, and 
exports to the central markets are still small 
—althouth they too have begun— but these 
limitations do not belie the fact that bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the corporations has grown, de-
spite the long-standing obstacles which still 
remain and the new ones which are arising. 
In fact, in studies of this and other ques-
tions there is usually a lack of historical perspec-
tive and of understanding of the contradictory 
58UNCTAD document TD/B/C.2/197, para. 11. 
and continually changing nature of the courses 
of the economy and society. For this reason, 
facts and considerations such as those given 
above are usually mingled with professions of 
naïve optimism or, worse still, uninspired con-
formism. But the picture is different if the iden-
tification of new developments —promising or 
negative, or both at once— goes hand in hand 
with a critical spirit and the search for positive 
transformations, as has usually been the case in 
the approach taken by CEPAL. 
Consequently, it does not seem justified to 
reject out of hand or entertain excessive reser-
vations about the hypothesis of a greater con-
tribution of foreign corporations to the diversi-
fication of manufactured exports. Ultimately, 
this will depend to a large extent on how the 
questions discussed below are tackled and re-
solved. 
5. The responsibility of national policies 
One fundamental question concerns the nature 
of, and the opportunities opened up by, nation-
al policies and decisions in this field and in 
relation to the overall problems we have been 
examining. 
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The responsibilities of the State are as 
broad as they are pressing; and in practice in 
most cases they have been faced up to in vary-
ing degrees and manners. Of course, there are 
exceptions, but these appear as eccentric and 
probably transient deviations from the rule; 
and besides, as mentioned above, even in these 
cases the State has in fact exercised its power, 
although in a direction opposed to, or dînèrent 
from, the predominant tendency. 
This public role is obviously conditioned 
by the social and political power relations with-
in each country and at the international level. 
The picture formed by the trends which 
w e have examined would appear to indicate 
that there is a sizable margin for manoeuvre to 
orient the industrialization strategy in such a 
way that it helps to secure a different form of 
insertion in the world economy, by entering 
into partnership with the transnational corpora-
tions and bringing pressure to bear upon them. 
T h e familiar view which almost completely 
identifies national entrepreneurs (private and 
public) and the State technocracy with foreign 
interests now appears rather less convincing or 
indisputable than a few years ago —although 
this is not to neglect or underestimate the prob-
lem. This is the result both of the strengthening 
of these circles' own interests and objectives 
and also of the emergence of new forms of as-
sociation with foreign corporations which go 
beyond the simple choice between foreign or 
national control. 
In addition —and what is perhaps more 
decisive— this change stems from the upheav-
als which have occurred in the central econ-
omies, particularly the United States, and also 
from the shifts in relative power and the in-
creased competitiveness among them, as well 
as the presence of the socialist group. The first 
of these has increased the periphery's degree of 
independence and the second has strengthen-
ed its hand at the negotiating table. It is enough 
to think back to the picture prevailing 10 or 20 
years ago in this sphere to realize the extent and 
importance of these changes. 
All in all, it is clear that the possibilities 
which have arisen vary significantly according 
to the specific weight of the countries. And here 
we encounter once again an aspect which nec-
cessarily recurs in CEPAL analyses: the impor-
tance of regional and subregional integration. 
Both from the standpoint of the requirements 
and opportunities of industrialization, inward-
and outward-directed, and from that of the pe-
riphery's bargaining power at the world level 
and vis-à-vis foreign corporations, this must be 
a key objective, underpinned, of course, by the 
preferential development of domestic markets. 
We shall not discuss here another vital as-
pect of the question, namely, the precise nature 
of the policies and instruments designed to car-
ry these purposes into practice. There is a 
wealth of Latin American experiences in this 
field in the last decade, analysed in many 
studies.5'1 We shall only point out that while 
considerable progress has been made in study-
ing and identifying the factors designed to 
promote exports, much remains to be done in 
terms of including this objective within the 
global industrialization strategy and the pro-
cess of integral development. 
6. Summing-up 
The following basic conclusions can be drawn 
from the foregoing discussion: 
(i) to secure relatively dynamic develop-
ment in the forthcoming decades will call for 
the maintenance or intensification of the flow 
of exports, and particularly of manufactured ex-
ports, because these offer better prospects than 
commodity exports, constitute a requirement 
for fostering industrialization and representthe 
main path for achieving a new form of insertion 
in the world economy; 
(ii) this objective does not involve a struc-
tural change in the nature of Latin American 
industrialization in the sense of a volte-face or 
an opposition between the inward-directed or 
outward-directed forms of"the process. The two 
are complementary, and domestic markets will 
continue to be its main suppor t - -reinforced by 
regional and subregional agreements in this 
field; 
(iii) some variants of 'openness to the ex-
terior' have rejected or underestimated this re-
lationship, advocating instead a line of conduct 
which follows or reproduces nineteenth-centu-
5aSee in particular CEPAL, "Políticas de promoción de 
exportaciones" (E/CEPAL/1046 and Add. 1-10). 
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ry approaches to the question involving various 
potential or already clearly visible dangers to 
economic, social and political variables of the 
utmost importance; 
(iv) a suitable strategy in this sphere —at 
least according to the standpoint taken by 
CEPAL studies— must from the outset include 
the question of the promotion of manufacturing 
exports in the broader framework of the process 
of industrialization and of development in gen-
eral; 
(v) the analysis of the present or foresee-
able conditions affecting the strengthening of 
this process by means of such exports suggests 
that this is a viable approach, despite the con-
straints which have appeared in the central 
markets, provided that the policies followed 
are capable —inter alia— of developing re-
gional links, negotiating with the transnational 
corporations and ensuring the State's role of 
guide and guardian. 
